Remarks of Senator John F. Kennedy on the Boston Army Base Pier to the Senate, Washington, D.C., May 11, 1954
Mr. President, I have joined today with my colleagues, the senior Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. Saltonstall] and Representative McCormack, in introducing a bill to prevent a scandal, which if permitted to develop would cause a serious financial loss not only to the people of Massachusetts and New England, but also to the taxpayers of the United States. The situation in brief is comparable to a parent abandoning his child because he does not wish to pay for its medical expenses. He hope that someone else will care for the child, but intends to abandon it whether such care is possible or not.
The child in this case is the Boston Army Base pier in South Boston, Mass., which was built by the Federal Government in 1918 and which has been of tremendous value to the Army in the course of two world wars. Since 1921, except for the war years of 1942 to 1946, the Maritime Administration has held jurisdiction over the pier by permit of the Army, in order to lease the area for commercial purposes to a public terminal operator, which at the present time is the Boston Tidewater Terminals, Inc.
The Army continues to use the pier for all of its cargo shipments in the area, and the Maritime Administration has consistently netted a sizable profit for the Federal Government through its lease of the property.
But the Department of Commerce has now told the Maritime Administration that it must return control of the property to the jurisdiction of the Army. As the Army originally indicated that the pier was surplus to its needs, if no other arrangements were concluded, the waterfront terminal section would be disposed of by the General Services Administration as surplus property. The bill we have introduced today, and on which we urge prompt action by the Congress, would provide for continued Army jurisdiction over these facilities, and their lease to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.
The speed with which the Federal Government announced its intention to abandon these maritime facilities was without question induced by the necessity of immediate costly repairs. In 1935, a one-half inch steel underwater skirt and pilings were constructed around the pier to prevent the damage caused by wood-eating marine borers. Rust and corrosion have now worn this steel to tin-can thinness, with hundreds of holes developing each year. A report of a survey made for the Army by the engineering firm of Fay, Spofford, and Thorndike stated that extensive rehabilitation would be necessary to prevent the steel from buckling at any time – even this very day – the sand pouring out, the pilings collapsing, and the whole base sliding into the 30-foot deep channel in Boston harbor. The Army states it has no funds available for such repairs; and the Maritime Administration is apparently unable to undertake them.
While the Army base pier is presently in full use, the state of deterioration is not hypothetical or projected, but very real. Prompt action must be taken if serious disaster, including the loss of many lives and much valuable property, is to be averted.
I. The Value of the Boston Army Base Pier
1. The Value to the Army
If Congress fails to take action to prevent the abandonment of these facilities, it will be wasting a valuable national asset in which the Federal Government has invested many millions of dollars since its original investment of $28 million. The replacement value of this pier is estimated to be from $75 million to $100 million. Only 2 years ago nearly $1 million was spent for additional improvements.
During World War II, the facilities were activated by the Army in 2 months; and because of Boston's proximity to the major European ports – it is from 200 to 2,000 miles closer than other eastern ports – the Boston Army pier handled millions of tons of military cargo and was in constant use as a port of embarkation in time of war. It has a direct, spacious and uncongested approach from the city, and provides the same freedom of movement for railroad cars and trucks. It has ample office and warehouse space. It has the more flexible quay type of pier. It is the only pier with double shipside tracks for direct loading. The Army should also be interested in the fact that some 5,000 reservists use the base as the only available training site. It might also be pointed out, in evaluating the Federal Government's responsibility to maintain the property which has served it so well, that retention of these commercial facilities as Federal property has cost the city of Boston more than $36 million in taxes.
2. The value to International Trade and the New England Economy
At a time when the administration seeks to expand international trade, it is important to note that the Army base pier, if properly restored and maintained, is superior to all other facilities in Boston Harbor. Other commercial piers in Boston offer mostly small one-story sheds. The Army base pier, on the other hand, has very ample facilities, all of which are now fully in use. It is the only pier in Boston with shipside warehouse space, double shipside tracks and the other advantages noted above with respect to its role as a port of embarkation. It can handle more than 100 railroad cars or trucks; its upper floors have 550,000 square feet of storage space; and its 7 full-sized covered berths are matched only by the east Boston pier of the Boston & Albany Rail Road.
Moreover, the Army base pier is an integral part of Boston's shipping industry. In 1953, it was used by more than 300 general cargo ships, about 25 percent of Boston's total, carrying about 335,000 tons. This average of 6 ships a week affected the jobs of thousands of railroad workers, truckers, and longshoremen. It is estimated that during the war year of 1944 nearly 2.5 million tons were handled through these Army facilities. If the 326 ships berthed at the Army base in 1953 had not come to Boston, the revenue loss to the port area would have been more than $3.5 million. The Army pier provides approximately 30 percent of the berthing piers in Boston; and its abandonment would leave Boston with only 22 covered berths, when in 1935 it had 35 such berths. The administration has a real opportunity to fulfill its pledge of assistance to our economy.
For these reasons, it would be most unwise, even if it were possible to do so, for the Federal Government to turn these facilities over to private commercial operation, either through an industrial lease from the Army or by its dispersal as surplus property through GSA. A firm which converted the property for industrial purposes might be able to amortize the heavy initial cost of rehabilitation; but this would impair the use of the facilities as a port of embarkation to the Army and as a port of international trade for New England.
It seems to me, therefore, to be obvious that the Federal Government must be dissuaded from carrying out its present plans to abandon or otherwise dispose of the Boston Army base pier. Toward this end, I toured the pier on March 7 with the New England Chief of the Army Corps of Engineers; the deputy post commander and the post engineer; and spokesmen for the Boston shipowners, longshoremen, the Port Authority, and the pier operators. Again, on March 12, along with my colleague, the Senior Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. Saltonstall], I discussed the question with a similar group which included representatives of the Maritime Administration and the Army. Finally, on April 5, representatives of my office met with other interested parties and agreed upon the course of action embodied in the bill we have introduced today.
II. Alternative Courses of Federal Action
There are three major courses available to Congress and the Federal Government:
First. The first is a hands-off, do-nothing policy. By taking no action to prevent further damage or to rehabilitate the property, and vainly hoping for private acquisition in a manner consistent with national policies of defense and international trade, the Federal Government is openly inviting the disaster which would occur when the snapping of a single steel chain could cause the whole Army base to slide into the channel. This is an expensive, not an economical, alternative – expensive in loss of life and property, expensive in loss of the facilities of the port of Boston, and expensive in the cost of removing the collapsed wreck from the channel.
Second. The second major alternative available to Congress is to authorize the Government to take such steps as may be necessary, including the removal of various parts of the wharf structures, to prevent their eventual collapse and the resulting destruction and interference. By letter of March 29, the Corps of Engineers has informed me that two such schemes would be possible:
A. The first would cost from $1.3 million to $1.44 million, but would provide a period of satisfactory safety of not more than 10 years. This plan entails cutting the present bulkhead at approximately the low-water line, removing the supporting rods and the outer 30 feet of the wharf apron, and placing fill on the water side of the bulkhead. This would enable retention of the wharf and pier sheds for land storage, although with a very limited use possible and although the water-side fill might be a hazard to navigation and would have to be strictly maintained in order to insure the stability of the bulkhead.
B. The second scheme for preventing collapse of the pier would cost from $4.252 million to $4.325 million, and would provide safety on a more permanent basis with a lesser annual maintenance cost. This plan entails far more extensive removals, including removal of the entire sheet-pile bulkhead, the tie rods, the apron for a distance of from 80 to 95 feet to the face of the pier, all timber piling within the area in which the apron was removed, and all of the wharf sheds' superstructure. This would leave only the major portion of the pier shed for land storage.
Obviously, the first or temporary plan is unsatisfactory, inasmuch as it simply means the problem must be faced all over again in 10 years and that only a limited unsatisfactory use could be made of the pier. The second scheme is more permanent, but, like any plan which emphasizes merely the prevention of collapse, it renders unusable the piers themselves, and is thus unsatisfactory from a point of view of military and economic value.
Third. The third course of action available – and that adopted in our bill – is to authorize funds for the rehabilitation of the pier, in order that these valuable maritime facilities may continue to serve the Nation in time of peace and war. The Fay, Spofford & Thorndike survey considered a number of rehabilitation schemes and rejected several. The Army has also eliminated as a practical alternative the partial restoration of the pier in order to make usable only three of the covered berths. This would cost only $5 million, but it is doubtful that it would be of assistance for more than 5 years.
As a result of this sifting, three fundamental plans for rehabilitating the pier are available:
A. Remove the present pier completely and install in its place a new open-deck wharf, at a construction cost of $12.35 million and an estimated life of 40 years.
B. Install a new precast concrete sheet pile bulkhead outside the present structure. This would cost an estimated $9.37 million; but its estimated life would be only 25 years, and its lower resistance and higher maintenance cost make this steelplate scheme which contemplates something which is similar to what is now on the pier, less advantageous.
C. Construct a gravity-type mass concrete seawall supported by steel-bearing piles to be located immediately outside the present steel sheet pile bulkhead. The wharf would be widened by about 30 feet, which might be of some inconvenience, although it would be basically practical. The channel would be deepened and new railroad facilities would be added. Using cast-in-place concrete for the gravity wall would result in a total construction cost of $10.5 million, and an estimated life of 60 years. If precast concrete blocks were to be used in constructing the gravity wall, the cost would be $13.28 million for an estimated life of 75 years.
If these schemes are analyzed in terms of cost per year of life, scheme ( C ), cast-in-place gravity wall, with a construction cost of only $10.05 million - which is only $700,000 more than the least expensive alternative, the new concrete sheet pile bulkhead - and with an estimated life of 60 years, would have the lowest cost per year of estimated life, $289,118. In addition, it presents an operation which would be practical and economical to maintain, which would present the minimum amount of hazards and disturbance during construction, and which would have a higher resistance to fire and explosion. This would appear to be the best of all possible schemes of rehabilitation, and funds therefore are provided in the bill introduced today; and certainly rehabilitation is to be preferred over the plans for removal, collapse, or inactivity, which are also of considerable expense.
III. The Cost of Rehabilitation
Mr. President, I hope that the Congress will recognize the responsibility of the Federal Government to undertake the rehabilitation of this valuable national asset in the manner which I have discussed. Here is an asset in which the Federal taxpayers have invested a substantial amount of money, which is valuable to the Nation in peacetime as an aid to international trade and our general economy, and which in time of war or national emergency is of critical importance to the national defense effort. An unwise step now could mean that our future mobilization efforts would be delayed while such facilities were reconstructed or reconverted, a delay which could well be crucial in the race to bring our pier facilities to the necessary level. The $75 to $100 million spent then would be unnecessary if a reasonable maintenance and restoration expenditure were made today. The Congress has an obligation to the taxpayers to eliminate unnecessary expenses; but we also have an obligation to be certain that such economy does not jeopardize the security of the Nation; and we have the further obligation to be reasonably certain that a present reduction of expenses will not result in a much greater expenditure in the future.
Certainly such expenditures would be consistent with the responsibility of the Army and the Maritime Administration, the value they have obtained from the pier and their investment in it, and the present policies of the Federal Government. Certainly such expenditures would not be too large in view of the amount of Federal money allocated to Massachusetts and New England for such projects over the years. In the current Army civil functions appropriations bill as it came to the Senate, for example, $560,000 will be spent in the State of Massachusetts; and more than $281 million in the rest of the country. In fact, the total amount to be spent in the six-State New England area is only $1,735,000, an amount less than that to be received by 24 individual States, practically all of whom contribute less in tax revenues than Massachusetts alone. Similarly, the share of all six New England States in the continental nonclassified projects to be authorized under the 1955 defense public works bill is only 8 percent of a total of $575.2 million; while the three Southern States of Georgia, North Carolina, and South Carolina will receive 11 percent.
However, inasmuch as the Commonwealth of Massachusetts is also vitally affected by the maintenance of these facilities, I urged when first touring the pier on March 7 that it join in the financing of such rehabilitation; and our bill so provides, as well as requiring the Commonwealth to pay all subsequent maintenance and repair costs.
We hear a great deal of talk these days about the partnership of the Federal Government with State and local governments in the development of projects beneficial to both. Here is an opportunity for the Federal Government to demonstrate on a worthy project that it means what it says; and to prevent the national disaster which would result from either the collapse of the pier or its unavailability for military use in an emergency.
Source: Papers of John F. Kennedy. Pre-Presidential Papers. Senate Files, Box 894, "Senate speech on Boston Army Base pier, 11 May 1954." John F. Kennedy Presidential Library.
